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Personal ambition always has been and will remain a more powerful incentive to exertion than
a desire for the general welfare.
Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (1911).
1 Introduction
Power and conflict are ubiquitous in organizational life. According to a leading scholar in the
field of organizational behavior, “power is, first of all, a structural phenomenon, created by the
division of labor and departmentation that characterizes the specific organization [...] being
investigated” (Pfeffer 1981, p. 4). Accordingly, power struggles should be particularly pro-
nounced in hierarchical, multi-divisional organizations. Based on this notion, sociologists and
social psychologists have studied conflict between different subunits of multi-divisional organi-
zations, including departments and schools of universities (Hills and Mahoney 1978; Pfeffer and
Moore 1980), government agencies (Wildavsky 1979), school districts (Freeman 1979), depart-
ments in firms (Perrow 1970), and local service agencies of United Fund, a nationwide charity
organization (Pfeffer and Leong 1977).
Similarly, the economics and finance literature views conflict as a problem primarily of multi-
divisional firms. For instance, in Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales
(2000), division managers squabble over compensation packages and the produced surplus, re-
spectively. In this literature inter-divisional conflict is a potential cost of integration. It is used
as an argument for why conglomerates have lower value than stand-alone firms, an empirical
regularity known as the conglomerate discount. In a similar vein, Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts
(1992) examine a model in which influence activities by a division make it optimal to divest the
division. More generally, firms with more hierarchy layers are viewed as having greater influence
problems, the reason being that they have more executives that can be influenced: “With new
levels of executives having authority, there are greater possibilities for [...] self-interested inter-
ventions. The opportunities for influence costs to arise also expand (Milgrom and Roberts 1990,
p. 84).” While this argument appears compelling, no paper has, to our knowledge, formally
examined whether influence costs in multi-divisional firms are greater than in firms which have
no divisional structure.
In this paper, we present a model that allows us to investigate the argument that division-
alization exacerbates influence problems. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we find
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that multi-divisional organizations may face lower influence costs than single-tier organizations,
even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that
can be influenced. If conflict is modelled using the widely popular conflict technology suggested
by Tullock (1975, 1980), we even find that multi-divisional organizations always exhibit lower
influence costs than single-tier organizations.1
Divisionalization of the overall conflict into many small, intra-division conflicts reduces the
prize in each conflict and hence the marginal return to influence activities. On the other hand,
divisionalization adds an extra round of wasteful conflict as the divisions must first compete for
divisional shares of the overall prize. We consider two different forms of inter-division conflict:
i) division managers fight on behalf of their divisions, and ii) the members of each division
collectively fight for a greater divisional share. As fighting for a greater divisional share is a
public good, expending resources in the inter-division conflict is subject to free-rider problems.
This effect is reinforced by the fact that a dollar going to a division yields less than a dollar
to the division’s members, since part of it is dissipated away in the subsequent intra-division
conflict. Regardless of how the inter-division conflict is modelled, we find that the benefits of
divisionalization may outweigh the costs.
Underlying our model is the notion that contracts in organizations are inherently incom-
plete, which implies that decisions must be made on the basis of negotiations and authority.
Whenever discretionary decisions are made, however, agents affected by the decision have an
incentive to take costly measures to influence the outcome. Examples range from the manipula-
tion of information (Milgrom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1990) to activities aiming at shifting
bargaining powers, such as entrenchment or investments in unproductive outside alternatives
(Rajan and Zingales 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Our notion
of organizations is thus a political one, with conflict being the norm rather than the exception:
“incentive theories of organizations argue that through the payment of a wage, particularly when
compensation is made contingent on performance, individuals hired into the organization come
to accept the organization’s goals. Political models of organizations assume that these control
devices, as well as others such as socialization, are not wholly effective in producing a coherent
and unified set of goals [...]. Conflict is viewed as normal or at least customary in political
1Wa¨rneryd (1998) uses this approach to explain federalist structures of jurisdictional interaction. Mu¨ller and
Wa¨rneryd (2001) show that selling a firm to outsiders may mitigate rent-seeking in partnerships.
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organizations” (Pfeffer 1981, p. 28).
Some examples of situations where influence activities may arise might be in order. Most
firms, including those relying heavily on objective performance measurement, augment their
incentive systems with subjective assessments of performance. For instance, Eccles and Crane
(1988, p. 166) show that even in investment banks where ample objective performance mea-
sures are available, compensation relies heavily on subjective assessments of factors such as the
“quality of the deals, the bankers’ contribution to customer satisfaction, training of younger as-
sociates, and marketing”. Similarly, at Lincoln Electric, which is widely known for its rigorous
use of piece-rate pay, half of a worker’s annual compensation comes in the form of a year-end
bonus based on supervisors’ subjective ratings of factors such as cooperation, innovation, and
dependability (Fast and Berg 1975). Lincoln Electric is anything but an exception. In a recent
study, Murphy and Oyer (2001) investigate the role of discretion in executive compensation
based on a sample of 280 bonus plans. They find that bonus payments are highly discretionary,
in particular for lower-level management. Discretion in bonus pay naturally gives rise to the
sort of influence activities studied in this paper.2
Another potential cause for influence activities is resource allocation. Cyert andMarch (1963)
explicitly argue that budgets are the outcomes of bargaining and political contests, rather than
the result of the application of rational and efficient decision rules. Mainly because of data
availability, earlier studies of resource allocation in organizations focused on public organiza-
tions: Wildavsky (1979) (government agencies), Hills and Mahoney (1978) and Pfeffer and
Moore (1980) (universities), and Pfeffer and Leong (1977) (United Fund) all find that that the
allocation of resources is determined by power and conflict. As Pfeffer (1981, p. 233) points
out, however, “anecdotal evidence suggests that corporations are not as different as one might
think, in terms of the influence of power and politics, from these public organizations.” Indeed,
recent studies investigating the allocation of capital across divisions in conglomerates find ev-
idence consistent with the notion that influence activities and conflict also affect the resource
allocation in corporations (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Scharfstein 1998; Wulf 2000).
In the second part of the paper, we consider two applications where corporate reorganization
2Any division of surplus potentially gives rise to conflict. The following statement concerns a leading Wall-
Street firm: “Despite efforts to tie the three semi-autonomous firms in London, Paris and New York more closely
together, Lazard remains factional. Tensions erupted recently of the division of profits [...].” Tension rises at
Dresdner Bank over Wasserstein, Financial Times, November 14, 2001.
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either alters the form or degree of divisionalization. The first application concerns divestitures.
The second application concerns the transition from the U- to the M-form organization by
many large US corporations in the 1920s, a phenomenon studied by, e.g., Chandler (1966) and
Williamson (1975). In the U- vs. M-form application, we show that the M-form involves lower
influence costs than the U-form if and only if the number of products, brands, or regions is
sufficiently large. This confirms a conjecture by Williamson (1975) that the M-form is better
suited to cope with expansion. In the divestiture application, we find that divesting is beneficial
only if the divisions are sufficiently similar in size. In particular, we show that it may be
a mistake to divest the division that rent-seeks most, for this may encourage the remaining
divisions to increase their rent-seeking activities. Models that have only a single division (e.g.,
Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts 1992) necessarily fail to capture such interaction effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 contains
our main results. Section 4 analyzes divestitures and the choice between the U- and M-form
organization from a distributional conflict perspective. Section 5 concludes.
2 Distributional Conflict
Consider a situation where a fixed, divisible rent z (e.g., assets, firm profits, or a research
budget) must be distributed among N organizational units, e.g., workers or managers in a firm
or professors in a university. To secure a share of the rent, the units may expend effort r at
unit cost. Using an established term, we refer to such activities as rent-seeking.3 We model
rent-seeking as a contest. Given a profile of rent-seeking expenditures r := (r1, ..., rn, ..., rN) ,
the share of z awarded to unit n is then given by the contest success function αn (r).
Skaperdas (1996) imposes a set of reasonable properties on αn (r) and shows that they are
equivalent to assuming that αn (r) takes the form
αn(r) :=
f(rn)PN
m=1 f(rm)
, (1)
where f , which we might call the impact function, is an increasing function. Hence rents are
distributed according to relative impact, and an agent’s impact is an increasing function of his
effort. We additionally assume that f is concave and thrice differentiable. This guarantees the
3Alternative expressions are safeguarding activities (Williamson 1985), influence activities (Milgrom 1988), and
power-seeking activities (Rajan and Zingales 2000).
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existence of a unique interior equilibrium (see Szidarovszky and Okuguchi 1997). Finally, we
assume that f(0) = 0. In the boundary case where nobody expends anything, we assume that
the rent is split equally. It is easy to see that this case cannot happen in equilibrium, since
given that no-one else expends anything, an agent can appropriate the entire rent in return for
an arbitrarily small expenditure.
If z represents a productive resource such as capital, rent-seeking takes costly resources (e.g.,
time and effort) away from productive activities. In this case, we may assume that the units
rent-seek because they derive private benefits that are proportional to the produced output
(e.g., better research enhances the value of a professor’s human capital). As adding a private
benefit parameter does not change our results, we refrain from doing so. Finally, to simplify the
exposition, we normalize z to one.
In the following, we compare two organizational forms. In a flat, or single-tier, organization
there is a single round of conflict where all N units directly compete with each other for the
overall rent. In contrast, in a multi-divisional organization the N units are divided into K <
N divisions (or faculties in the university example). In each division, the units belonging to
the division compete for a fraction, or division share, of the overall rent. Division shares are
determined endogenously in a preceding contest between the different divisions. Hence a multi-
divisional organization involves two rounds, or K + 1 conflicts: one inter-division conflict where
the different divisions compete for greater division shares, and K subsequent intra-division
conflicts. We consider two different scenarios for the inter-division conflict.
1) Rent-seeking by division members. Division shares are determined by the collective efforts of
individual division members. Here we assume that effort choices are made noncooperatively.
2) Rent-seeking by division representatives. Division shares are determined by the efforts of
division representatives, such as division managers (or faculty deans in the university example).
Representatives may have different motives to rent-seek, depending on whether they are profes-
sional bureaucrats or ordinary division members to whom the task of representing the division
has been delegated. We shall be more explicit about these motives below.
Sometimes organizational structures are given, e.g., for historical or political reasons, or
simply because there is a “natural” way of organizing economic activity. For instance, there are
presumably good reasons for why universities are organized into faculties and departments, and
efficiency considerations may play a minor role there. Hierarchy, for our purposes, may then
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be viewed as allocation procedures and rules that may, but need not correspond to hierarchies
in terms of organizational charts. Suppose a university has a research budget coming from
government grants, tuition fees, or donations, that must be divided among its professors. Under
a single-tier hierarchy, professors directly apply for research grants at the university level. In
contrast, under a multi-divisional hierarchy, the research budget is first divided across faculties
(and only those can apply at this stage). In a second step, the professors within a faculty apply
for a personal share of the faculty budget. Similarly, suppose firm profit shall be divided among
the firm’s employees in the form of bonus payments. Under a single-tier hierarchy, the bonus
is directly divided among the employees. In contrast, under a divisional structure the bonus is
first divided across divisions. Subsequently, the division boni are divided across the employees
in the respective divisions.
3 Hierarchy
3.1 Decentralization of Conflict
As a benchmark, we first find equilibrium rent-seeking expenditure for the single-tier organiza-
tion. The objective function of unit n is αn − rn. Suppose the N units make their rent-seeking
expenditure noncooperatively. There is then a unique equilibrium where the equilibrium expen-
diture of unit n is given by the first-order condition
f 0 (r?n)
P
m 6=n f (r?m)³PN
m=1 f (r
?
m)
´2 = 1.
As this must hold for all units, the common equilibrium rent-seeking expenditure r? in the
single-tier organization is given by
h(r?) =
N − 1
N2
, (2)
where h(r) := f(r)/f 0(r).
We shall assume that h is convex. As the following observation shows, convexity of h has a
natural interpretation.
Observation. In a contest with N participants for a prize of value z, the dissipation rate Nr?/z
is increasing in N for all N if and only if h is convex.
Proof. We have that
d
dN
Nr?
z
=
1
z
µ
r? +N
∂r?
∂N
¶
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=
1
z
µ
r? − N − 2
N − 1
h (r?)
h0 (r?)
¶
,
where the second equality follows from (2). As limN→∞ (N − 2) / (N − 1)=1 and h0 > 0, the
rhs is positive for all N if and only if r?h0 (r?) ≥ h (r?) , which holds if and only if h00 ≥ 0. 2
Hence convexity of h is equivalent to the property that an increasing fraction of the prize is
dissipated as the number of contestants grows large. Most conflict technologies studied in the
literature, including the popular specification f (x) = xγ, exhibit this property.4
Consider next the multi-divisional organization. To find subgame perfect equilibrium out-
comes, we solve the game backwards, beginning with the second round of conflict where in each
division the Nk ≥ 1 division members fight over the division share βk, where PKk=1 βk = 1 andPK
k=1Nk = N . At this stage, division shares are already determined, which is why we take
them as given. Let Gk denote the set comprising all members of group k. The objective function
of an individual unit n ∈ Gk is then βkαn − rn, where αn is the unit’s personal share of the
division rent. We allow for arbitrary, asymmetric divisions of the overall rent and the N units
into division shares and divisions, respectively. We also allow for degenerate divisions with only
one unit. As K < N, at least one division must have Nk ≥ 2 units, however.
Analogously to the single-tier organization, there is a unique equilibrium where all members
of a division make the same expenditure. Denote this common, division-specific expenditure
level by r??k . It is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
h (r??k ) = βk
Nk − 1
N2k
. (3)
We can now ask whether aggregate rent-seeking expenditure in the K intra-division conflicts
alone is greater or smaller than aggregate expenditure in the single-tier organization. If it is
greater, a multi-divisional organization must necessarily involve greater aggregate expenditure
than a single-tier organization, since in addition to the K intra-division conflicts it also has the
inter-division conflict. If it is smaller, the comparison between single-tier and multi-divisional
organizations depends on the magnitude of expenditure in the inter-division conflict. As a first
step, we must therefore determine whether it pays to decentralize a grand conflict where all N
4Note that
d2h (r)
dr2
= −f
00 (r)
f 0 (r)
+
2f (r) f 00 (r)2
f 0 (r)3
− f (r) f
000 (r)
f 0 (r)2
.
As the first two terms are positive, convexity of h is equivalent to the assumption that f 000 is small or negative.
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contestants fight over a common prize into K local conflicts, where in each local conflict a subset
Nk of the contestants fights over only a fraction βk of the prize.
Decentralization of the grand conflict into subconflicts involves two countervailing effects.
On the one hand, reducing the size of the prize lowers the marginal return to rent-seeking in
each subconflict. On the other, reducing the number of contestants raises it. Convexity of h
guarantees that the overall effect is unambiguous.
Theorem 1 (Decentralization of Conflict). Aggregate rent-seeking expenditure in the K
intra-divisional conflicts alone is strictly lower than in the single-tier organization where all N
units directly compete with each other.
Proof. Since
PK
k=1Nk = N, K > 1, and (x− 1) /x is an increasing function, it holds for all
βk satisfying
PK
k=1 βk = 1 that
N − 1
N2
>
XK
k=1
βk
Nk
N
Nk − 1
N2k
.
Inserting (2)—(3) yields
h (r?) >
XK
k=1
Nk
N
h (r??k ) .
As h is increasing and convex, we have that r? >
PK
k=1(Nk/N)r
??
k . Multiplying both sides by
N then gives Nr? >
PK
k=1Nkr
??
k . 2
Theorem 1 is a fundamental result of this paper. It states that, provided h is convex,
decentralization is optimal regardless of how the N contestants and the rent are divided into
divisions and division shares, respectively. If h is not convex, specific division rules may still
involve lower equilibrium aggregate expenditure. For instance, aggregate expenditure is always
strictly lower under a symmetric division rule where group size and budget share are the same
in each subcontest (Wa¨rneryd 2001).
Given Theorem 1, it is now straightforward to characterize situations in which a multi-
divisional organization involves lower aggregate rent-seeking expenditure than a single-tier or-
ganization. We begin with the case where rent-seeking in the inter-division conflict is performed
by individual division members.
3.2 Rent-Seeking by Division Members
Suppose rent-seeking in the inter-division conflict is performed by individual division members.
Denote the expenditure of unit n in the inter-division conflict by tn. Division shares depend on
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the collective efforts of division members as follows.5
βk(t) :=
 f
³P
n∈Gk tn
´
/
PK
l=1 f
³P
n∈Gl tn
´
if
PK
l=1 f
³P
n∈Gl tn
´
> 0
1/K otherwise.
Consider the incentives of an individual unit. As a dollar going to division k must be shared
withNk−1 fellow division members, fighting in the inter-division conflict is a public good. Hence
there is a free-rider problem. To this is added that the subsequent intra-divisional rent-sharing
is itself the result of a wasteful conflict where each of the Nk division members spends resources
equal to r??k . Hence the utility of an individual division member from the division share βk is
less than βk/Nk. Specifically, it is
ρk(βk) :=
βk
Nk
− r??k (βk), (4)
where r??k (βk) is given by (3).
As all units rationally anticipate the outcome in the intra-division conflict, their objective
function in the inter-division conflict is ρk(βk) − tn. Due to the public-good nature of this
conflict, first-order conditions only determine aggregate division expenditure, i.e., there are
multiple equilibria, all of which involve the same aggregate division expenditure. We focus on
symmetric equilibria where all members of a division make the same expenditure t?k. Equilibrium
expenditure in the inter-division conflict is then given by
dρk
dβk
f 0(Nkt?k)
P
l 6=k f(Nlt?l )³PK
l=1 f(Nlt
?
l )
´2 ≤ 1, (5)
where dρk/dβk represents the (marginal) valuation of an individual unit in division k for the
division share βk.
Given the public-good nature of the inter-division conflict, it is now obvious that aggregate
expenditure in this conflict can be made arbitrarily small by increasing division size. Together
with Theorem 1, this implies that total rent-seeking expenditure in the multi-divisional organi-
zation will be lower than in the single-tier organization.
5This formulation follows Skaperdas (1998). It takes the following view of the inter-division conflict. As all
members of a division have the same objective in this conflict, their expenditures, while chosen noncooperatively,
are channeled through the same impact function. We refer the reader to Skaperdas’s paper for further motivation
and discussion.
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Proposition 1. Suppose rent-seeking in the inter-division conflict is performed by individual
division members. If divisions are sufficiently large, aggregate rent-seeking expenditure in the
multi-divisional organization is strictly less than in the single-tier organization.
Proof. For any division in which t?k > 0 the first-order condition (5) must hold with equality.
Multiplying (5) with f(Nkt
?
k)/f(Nkt
?
k) = 1 and using the definition of βk, we obtain
dρk
dβk
βk (1− βk) = h(Nkt?k).
From (3) and (4) we have that
dρk
dβk
=
1
Nk
− Nk − 1
N2k
1
h0
¡
r??k
¢ .
From f 00 ≤ 0 we have that h0 = 1 − ff 00/f 02 ≥ 1. Hence as Nk → ∞, the valuation dρk/dβk
goes to zero. Moreover, it follows from f(0) = 0 and f 0 > 0 that h (0) = 0. In conjunction
with the fact that h0 > 0 and βk ∈ [0, 1], this implies that Nkt?k → 0. Hence if divisions are
sufficiently large, aggregate expenditure in the inter-division conflict becomes arbitrarily small.
In conjunction with Theorem 1, this proves the proposition. 2
Incidentally, it suffices that K−1 divisions are sufficiently large. The Kth division can then
extract the entire rent by spending an arbitrarily small amount.
What is less obvious is that for specific conflict technologies, multi-divisional organizations
may involve lower rent-seeking expenditure than single-tier organizations regardless of the di-
vision size. An example is the widely used conflict technology f (x) = xγ , where 0 < γ ≤ 1
ensures that the impact function is concave.6
Example 1. Suppose f (x) = xγ . For simplicity, assume that there are two divisions. Consider
first the single-tier organization. Solving (2) for r?, we obtain
r? = γ
N − 1
N2
. (6)
Hence aggregate expenditure equals Nr? = γN/(N − 1), which is strictly increasing in N . As
N →∞, aggregate expenditure converges to 1/h0 (0) = γ.
6This contest success function was popularized by Tullock (1975, 1980). As γ →∞, the rent-seeking technology
converges to the perfectly discriminating all-pay auction. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, Chapter 10) and Fullerton
and McAfee (1999) illustrate how this success function may be derived from more primitive assumptions. For a
general discussion, see Skaperdas (1992, 1996).
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Consider next the multi-divisional organization. From (3), we have that
r??k (βk) = γβk
Nk − 1
N2k
. (7)
The valuation of an individual unit n ∈ Gk in the inter-division conflict is therefore
dρk
dβk
=
1
Nk
− γNk − 1
N2k
=: ρˆk. (8)
Observe that valuations are a strictly decreasing function of division size. As the members of
both divisions will expend positive effort in the inter-division conflict, the first-order condition
(5) holds with equality. Solving (5) for t?k, we have that
t?k = γ
ρˆk
Nk
Q2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l
(
P2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l )
2
,
implying that
β?k =
ρˆγkP2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l
. (9)
Hence the larger division gets a smaller share of the rent. Two factors work together to generate
this effect. First, in the larger division, more of the divisional rent is dissipated in the intra-
divisional conflict. Hence each individual’s valuation of an increment in the divisional share is
relatively lower than that of an individual in the smaller division. Second, the free-rider problem
in the inter-divisional conflict is more severe in the larger division.
We can finally compare rent-seeking expenditure for the single-tier and multi-divisional or-
ganization. Expenditure is greater under the single-tier organization if and only if
N − 1
N
− 1P2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l
2X
l=1
Nl − 1
Nl
ρˆγl −
Q2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l
(
P2
l=1 ρˆ
γ
l )
2
2X
l=1
ρˆl > 0,
or
2X
l=1
βl
Nl
−
Ã
2X
l=1
1
Nl
− γ
2X
l=1
Nl − 1
N2l
!
2Y
l=1
βl − 1
N
> 0, (10)
where the lhs in (10) is bounded from below by
P2
l=1
¡
β2l /Nl
¢− 1/N. But
2X
l=1
β2l
Nl
− 1
N
=
1
NN1N2
(N1 −Nβ1)2 > 0.
Hence the single-tier organization involves greater rent-seeking expenditure than the multi-
divisional organization. This holds for any value of γ ≤ 1. 2
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3.3 Rent-Seeking by Division Representatives
Suppose division representatives, such as division managers (or faculty deans in the university
example), fight on behalf of their divisions. The representatives rent-seek because they have
a (marginal) valuation λk > 0 for the rent. This valuation may represent an exogenous taste
for large empires, or it may be endogenous and depend on the equilibrium outcome in the
subsequent intra-division conflict. The rent-seeking effort of the representative of division k is
denoted by sk. Division shares are determined in the same fashion as individual shares, i.e., by
βk(s) :=
 f (sk) /
PK
l=1 f (sl) if
PK
l=1 f (sl) > 0
1/K otherwise.
The objective function of the representative of division k in the inter-division conflict is thus
λkβk − sk. We assume that division representatives make their rent-seeking expenditures non-
cooperatively. Equilibrium expenditure in the inter-division conflict is then given by
λk
f 0 (s?k)
P
l 6=k f (s?l )³PK
l=1 f
¡
s?l
¢´2 ≤ 1. (11)
It is now obvious that aggregate expenditure in the inter-division conflict can be made arbi-
trarily small if valuations are sufficiently low. Together with Theorem 1, this implies that total
expenditure in the multi-divisional organization will be lower than in the single-tier organization.
Proposition 2. Suppose rent-seeking in the inter-division conflict is performed by division
representatives. If the representatives’ valuations are sufficiently low, aggregate rent-seeking ex-
penditure in the multi-divisional organization is strictly less than in the single-tier organization.
Proof. For any division in which s?k > 0 the first-order condition (11) must hold with equality.
Multiplying (11) by f(Nkt
?
k)/f(Nkt
?
k) = 1 and using the definition of βk, we obtain
λkβk (1− βk) = h(s?k).
The rest is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. 2
Again, it suffices that K − 1 valuations are low. The Kth representative will then automat-
ically make a low expenditure in equilibrium.
As argued earlier, valuations may depend on the equilibrium outcome in the subsequent intra-
division conflict. If valuations are a decreasing function of intra-division expenditure, divisions
where a greater fraction of the rent is dissipated receive fewer rents, which is efficient. On the
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other hand, if valuations are an increasing function of intra-division expenditure, divisions with
a higher dissipation rate also receive more rents. In what follows, we provide an example for
each of these two cases. We again assume that f takes the form f (x) = xγ , where 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Example 2: Incentives of Faculty Deans. Frequently, representatives are regular group
members who have been elected to act on behalf of the group. In universities, for instance,
faculty deans are usually regular professors who head the faculty for a prespecified time period.
As the dean must share the faculty budget with other faculty members, his incentives to lobby
on behalf of the faculty are dulled. The problem is exacerbated if the sharing is the result of a
costly intra-faculty conflict where additional resources are wasted.
Consider first the intra-faculty conflict. Clearly, equilibrium expenditure in this conflict is
given by (7). The dean’s valuation in the inter-faculty conflict is thus
λk =
1
Nk
− γNk − 1
N2k
,
which is decreasing in Nk. Hence deans of larger faculties have lower valuations. Primarily, this
is because an extra dollar going to a larger faculty must be shared with more professors. As
the dissipation rate is increasing in faculty size, this also means that faculties where a greater
fraction of funds is dissipated receive less funds than faculties where only little is dissipated.
Consider finally the choice between different application rules mentioned at the end of Section
2. For simplicity, assume again that K = 2. By (6), aggregate expenditure under the one-round
application rule where professors from all faculties directly apply for funds at the university level
is
Nr? = γ
N − 1
N
.
In contrast, under a sequential application procedure faculties must first compete for greater
faculty budgets. Subsequently, professors within a faculty may apply for a personal share of the
faculty budget. From (11), we have that aggregate expenditure in the inter-faculty conflict is
2X
l=1
s?k = γ
Q2
l=1 λ
γ
l
(
P2
l=1 λ
γ
l )
2
2X
l=1
λl.
The share of the overall budget going to faculty k is given by (9). Accordingly, combined
rent-seeking expenditure in the two intra-faculty conflicts is
2X
l=1
Nlr
??
l =
γP2
l=1 λ
γ
l
2X
l=1
Nl − 1
Nl
λγl .
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Aggregate expenditure in each conflict is the same as in Example 1, with λk and s
?
k being
replaced by ρˆk and Nkt
?
k, respectively. Accordingly, a sequential application rule where first
faculties and then professors apply for funds involves strictly lower expenditure than a one-
round application rule where professors directly apply for funds. 2
Example 3: Corrupt Organizations. Suppose executives at the middle and top level of
an organization personally benefit from the rent-seeking efforts by the agents below them, e.g.,
because rent-seeking comes partly in the form of wining and dining or bribes. A novel element
here is that not all rent-seeking is wasteful; part of it is merely a utility transfer from agents at
the bottom of the organization to agents at the top. This automatically endogenizes division
representatives’ incentives. As intra-division expenditure is an increasing function of division
shares, division representatives, in an effort to maximize subsequent bribes, will seek to maximize
division shares.
In particular, suppose a unit of effort expended by lower-level agents increases the utility
of agents at the next higher level by δ ∈ (0, 1). From(7), we then have that the valuation of
division k’s representative in the inter-division conflict is
λk = δγ
Nk − 1
Nk
.
Unlike Example 2, representatives of larger divisions now have higher valuations, as for any
given division share βk they can expect larger bribes. As division size and dissipation rate are
positively related, this also means that a greater fraction of the rent goes to a division where
more of it is dissipated away.
One can again compare single-tier and multi-divisional organizations. As rent-seeking is now
only partly wasteful, the appropriate efficiency measure is the deadweight loss from rent-seeking,
which is strictly lower than aggregate rent-seeking expenditure. The formal analysis is similar
to Examples 1 and 2. Unlike these examples, however, there are now parameter ranges where
the deadweight loss is lower under under the single-tier organization.7 2
7This is, for instance, the case if either both γ and δ are sufficiently close to one, or if both divisions are
sufficiently large.
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4 Applications
We now apply our framework to study divestitures and corporate reorganization. As in the
preceding examples, we assume that f takes the form f (x) = xγ , where 0 < γ ≤ 1. Regarding
the inter-division conflict, we assume that all rent-seeking on this level is performed by individual
division members.
4.1 Divestiture of Unrelated Divisions
Suppose a firm has two divisions with Nk units (e.g., projects, departments) each. The two
divisions are unrelated, i.e., there are no synergy gains. The question is whether the firm should
retain both divisions or spin one of them off. We again normalize the firm’s rent to one. If the
firm is disintegrated, the rent associated with a stand-alone firm is zk > 0, where
P2
k=1 zk = 1
underscores that the two divisions are unrelated.
Consider first the two divisions in isolation. By analogy with (7), aggregate rent-seeking
expenditure in the two stand-alone firms is given by
2X
l=1
Nlr
??
l = γ
2X
l=1
Nl − 1
Nl
zl.
Aggregate expenditure in the integrated firm is the same as in Example 1. Comparing aggregate
expenditure under integration and non-integration, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the two divisions are equal in size, divesting is strictly optimal. In contrast,
divesting is never optimal if the two divisions are sufficiently different in size.
The first statement is straightforward. If N1 = N2, aggregate rent-seeking expenditure in
the two stand-alone conflicts is the same as in the two intra-division conflicts. As the multi-
divisional firm involves a second, inter-division conflict where additional resources are wasted,
divesting is strictly optimal.
As an illustration of the second statement, fix N1 and let N2 → ∞. As division 2 grows
in size, the public-good problem in this division becomes so big that aggregate expenditure by
division 2 in the inter-division conflict tends to zero. Accordingly, (almost) all of the rent goes
to division 1. Moreover, to secure this rent, the units in division 1 need to make lower and
lower expenditures. In the limit, aggregate expenditure in the multi-divisional firm tends to
γ (N1 − 1) /N1. In contrast, combined rent-seeking expenditure in the two stand-alone firms
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tends to z1γ (N1 − 1) /N1 + γz2, which is strictly more. The general idea is that asymmetries
among divisions tilt the allocation in favor of smaller divisions.8 Smaller divisions face lower
public-good problems, which is why they rent-seek more on the inter-divisional level than larger
divisions. As smaller divisions also exhibit a lower dissipation rate, this further implies that a
greater fraction of the rent goes to divisions where less is wasted.
Proposition 3 and the subsequent discussion is not meant to provide a full-fledged theory
of divestitures. For this, a much richer framework would be needed. Rather, the point is
to show that firms with equally strong divisions are likely to face higher influence costs than
firms with unequal divisions. The argument is similar to Che and Gale (1998), where caps
on campaign expenditures reduce asymmetries among political candidates. The result is that
weaker candidates do more lobbying than they otherwise would, with the consequence that
overall lobbying expenditures might increase.
An argument frequently found in the literature is that divisions that rent-seek too much
should be divested (e.g., Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts 1992). As the above example shows, this
may be misleading. In the example, division 1 is the one that rent-seeks most. And yet, divesting
division 1 may have fatal consequences. In particular, it may increase overall rent-seeking. The
argument, again, is that the only reason why division 2 rent-seeks little is that it faces a strong
competitor in division 1. Once division 1 is taken away, rent-seeking in division 2 increases.
Models of divisional rent-seeking that have only one division (as, e.g., Meyer, Milgrom, and
Roberts 1992) necessarily fail to capture such interaction effects.
4.2 U-Form vs. M-Form
The early 1920s witnessed a radical change in the way many large US corporations such as
DuPont or General Motors were organized (Chandler 1966). Whereas firms had previously been
organized along functional lines (e.g., manufacturing, sales, etc.), with the functional divisions
being subdivided into brand, regional, or product subdivisions, they now came to be organized
along brand, regional, or product lines, with the divisions being subdivided into functional
subdivisions. Chandler refers to the two organizational forms as U- and M-form, respectively.
The merits of the M-form vis-a`-vis the U-form are discussed at length in Chandler (1966)
8If z is a resource, this implies that small divisions receive a disproportionally large share of the resource. If the
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale there is thus a tradeoff: firms with unequal divisions
exhibit lower influence costs but produce at higher marginal cost than firms with equally strong divisions.
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and Williamson (1975). One argument of relevance for the theory put forth in this paper
is that switching to the M-form “reduced partisan political input into the resource allocation
process” (Williamson 1975, p. 137—138, emphasis added). Moreover, Williamson attributes
the disadvantages of the U-form partly to its inability to cope with expansion. For instance,
he argues that “expansion of the U-form enterprise [...] alters the character of the strategic
decision-making process in ways that favor attending to other-than-profit objectives” (p. 133).
In the following, we shall explore Williamson’s argument in more detail. Suppose a firm has
A ≥ 2 functions and B ≥ 2 products (or brands or regions). Under the U-form structure, the
firm then has K = A divisions with Nk = B units each, while under the M-form structure it has
K = B divisions with Nk = A units each. Along with Williamson, we assume that the units
compete for resources (which in turn generate rents). Holding the number of functions fixed, we
model expansion as an increase in the number of products, brands, or regions, i.e., an increase
of B vis-a`-vis A.
The analysis in Section 4.1 readily extends to more than two divisions. As both the U-
and M-form are symmetric, (5), in conjunction with (8), implies that aggregate rent-seeking
expenditure in the inter-division conflict amounts to
KNkt
?
k = γ
K − 1
K
Ã
Nk(1− γ) + γ
N2k
!
. (12)
Moreover, from (7) we have that aggregate rent-seeking expenditure in the K intra-division
conflicts is
KNkr
??
k = γ
Nk − 1
Nk
. (13)
Combining (12)—(13) and rearranging terms, we obtain for the difference in rent-seeking expen-
diture between the U- and M-form organization
AB (r??kU + t
?
kU − r??kM − t?kM) = γ2
(A−B) (A+B − 1−AB)
A2B2
.
Given that A,B ≥ 2, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4. Suppose a firm has A functions and B products (or brands or regions). If
A > B (A < B), the U-form involves lower (higher) aggregate rent-seeking expenditure than the
M-form, while if A = B expenditure is the same under both organizational forms.
In words, aggregate rent-seeking expenditure under the M-form is lower than under the
U-form if and only if the firm has fewer functions than products, brands, or regions. This
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holds for any impact factor γ ∈ (0, 1]. Hence for small firms with few products or a limited
geographical presence, the U-form is better suited. However, as the firms grow in terms of
products, brands, or geographical presence, switching to the M-form may become optimal, like
Williamson conjectured.
Intuitively, the optimal organizational structure is the one with the greater number of “lo-
cal” conflicts, or greater degree of decentralization. On the one hand, greater decentralization
lowers rent-seeking expenditure on the intra-division level. On the other, it raises expenditure
on the inter-division level, since reducing division size lessens the public-good problem in the
inter-division conflict. For the specific conflict technology under consideration, the first effect
outweighs the second, and the total effect of an increase in decentralization is positive.
5 Concluding Remarks
Previous approaches to hierarchical structure in organizations give essentially technological rea-
sons for its existence. Examples include information processing and team theory (Radner 1993),
supervision and task assignment (Rosen 1982), the allocation of authority (Hart andMoore 1999)
or expert knowledge (Garicano 2000), the coordination of interactions across activities (Harris
and Raviv 2000), and the question of rigidity vs. flexibility with respect to the environment
(Harrington 1998).
In this paper we have stressed that structure also determines at which, and how many, points
in the organization costly influence may be applied in order to divert resources in the absence of
complete contracting, and to which extent free-rider incentives will be operative in rent-seeking.
We have shown that even in the absence of technological efficiency effects, divisionalization may
lower the deadweight losses from distributional conflict in the organization.
In doing this, we have implicitly assumed that organizational structure is a variable that
can be controlled by some optimizing agent–e.g., the owner of the firm, or its partners at
some ex ante constitutional stage. That is, we have studied structure as a form of contract,
and shown how it may lessen inefficiencies due to incompleteness in other contracts. But of
course organizational structure is also itself subject to influence activities, and cannot really be
taken for given. For instance, Pfeffer (1981, p. 266) remarks: “Organizational structures have
most frequently been analyzed as a problem in design or engineering, with the issue being how
structures can be developed to maximize the organization’s effectiveness. An alternative view [...]
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looks at structure as being the outcome of a political contest for control within the organization
which, at the same time, provides participants with further advantages in the political struggles
because of their structural positions.” Along similar lines, Downs (1967), in his classic study
of bureaucracy, devotes much time to the incentives for officials to try to expand the size and
domain of their bureaus (divisions, departments). Incorporating such behavior into the present
framework should be an interesting task for future research.
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